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FORUM
The $300,000 Question: Remedies for the
New Home Buyer
by Barbara Gathright
The purchase of a new home is
generally regarded as the single
largest purchase a consumer makes.
Figures from the National Associa-
tion of Homebuilders show that in
1978 the average new home retailed
for $55,700. Today that figure is up
to $68,200, an increase of $12,500 or
about twenty-two percent. Of
course, the average retail prices does
not reflect the cost of financing. As-
suming a twenty percent down pay-
ment, and using current interest
rates (153/4%), a thirty year mort-
gage would mean that a $68,000
house would actually cost $300,000,
or almost five times the original
price.
As basic purchase prices and bank
financing rates have combined to
escalate the cost of a new home,
sales in the new home market have
fallen dramatically. While national
figures for March of 1981 show
518,000 new units were sold, fig-
ures for March of 1982 show only
334,000 units sold. These figures
represent a 36% decline in a one
year period and a 62% decline over
the October of 1978 peak figure of
872,000 units sold.
The reason behind the trend is
clear; inflation has made such a large
purchase a very serious decision. But
once the buyer has purchased the
new home, what kind of protection
against defects does he have? What
can the buyer do when the roof leaks
or the well runs dry? Is there any
consumer protection available? Can
the buyer seek a remedy in the
courts?
The protection afforded the buyer
of a used home is even less than
that afforded the new home buyer
and this article does not discuss the
issues relating to used home sales.
Furthermore, the parties against
whom the buyer may seek a remedy
are limited in this article to the seller
and the builder, although the po-
tential liability of the real estate bro-
kers and the builder's financing
agent are possible remedies which
should not be overlooked. Thus, this
article focuses on some of the rem-
edies available against the builder
and seller when a new home buyer
discovers his dream house is a
nightmare.
Implied Warranties
One of the most frequently used
remedies available to the new home
buyer is based on an implied war-
ranty of habitability. This warranty
was first recognized in 1931 by the
English courts and applied to the
sale of a partially-finished home.
Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd.,
[1931] 2 K.B. 113, 1 All E.R. 93 (1931).
American courts were slow to fol-
low the lead of their English coun-
terparts; it was over a quarter of a
century later that an American ju-
risdiction adopted the English ap-
proach. In Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103
Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819
(1957), the court held an implied
warranty attached to the sale of a
partially-finished home. Seven years
later, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado held an implied warranty would
apply to the sale of a completed
home as well, since they could find
no reasonable basis for the distinc-
tion between partially and fully con-
structed houses. Carpenter v. Dono-
hoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399,
402 (1964). Today the implied war-
ranty of habitability is recognized in
almost every jurisdiction. See Shedd,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability:
New Applications, New Implications, 8
R.E.L.J. 291, 303 (1980).
Unlike the Colorado and Ohio
courts, the Maryland courts refused
to recognize the implied warranty
of habitability absent legislative in-
tervention. Allen v. Wilkinson, 250
Md. 395, 398, 243 A.2d 515, 517
(1968). In 1970, however, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted a law creat-
ing implied warranties for improve-
ments on real property, 1970 Md.
Laws 420. The statute states in part:
(a) Warranties which are im-
plied.-Except as provided in
subsection (b) or unless ex-
cluded or modified pursuant to
subsection (d), in every sale,
warranties are implied that, at
the time of the delivery of the
deed to a completed improve-
ment or at the time of comple-
tion of an improvement not
completed when the deed is
delivered, the improvement is:
(1) Free from faulty materials;
(2) Constructed according to
sound engineering standards;
(3) Constructed in a work-
manlike manner; and
(4) Fit for habitation.
Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 10-203
(1981).
Maryland courts have rarely had
occasion to discuss this provision;
in the twelve years since its enact-
ment, only two cases discussing the
substance of the statute have reached
the appellate level. The Court of
Special Appeals first applied the
warranty in Krol v. York Terrace Bldg.,
Inc., 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589
(1970). In that case, the court de-
termined "that an adequate supply
of potable water is one prerequisite
of fitness for habitation." Id. at 333,
370 A.2d at 596.
In 1979, the Maryland Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the Krol deci-
sion in another dry well case, stress-
ing the reasonableness of expecting
an adequate water supply in a new
home. Loch Hill Const. Co. v. Fricks,
284 Md. 708, 716, 399 A.2d 883, 889
(1979). According to the courts, the
legislative intent of the statute is to
protect the innocent purchaser in
light of the vendor's superior
knowledge. Id. at 718-19, 399 A.2d
at 890.
Much of the judicial debate on
implied warranties has centered on
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the expiration of the warranty and
the limitations on an action for
breach. The statute states:
(b) Expiration of warranty.-
Unless an express warranty
specifies a longer period of time,
the warranties provided for in
this subtitle expire:
(1) In the case of a dwelling
completed at the time of the de-
livery of the deed to the pur-
chaser, one year after the deliv-
ery or after the taking of
possession by the purchaser,
whichever occurs first; and
(2) In the case of a dwelling
not completed at the time of de-
livery of the deed to the pur-
chaser, one year after the date
of the completion or taking of
possession by the purchaser,
whichever occurs first.
(c) Limitation of actions.-Any
action arising under this sub-
title shall be commenced within
two years after the defect was
discovered or should have been
discovered or within two years
after the expiration of the war-
ranty, whichever occurs first.
Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 10-204
(1981).
Thus under the Maryland statute
this warranty may begin to run at
two different times in two different
situations. If the house is completed
when the deed is delivered, the
warranty begins to run at the time
the deed is delivered or at the time
the buyer takes possession, which-
ever comes first. If the deed is de-
livered before the house is com-
pleted, then the warranty begins to
run upon the completion of the
house or the taking of possession,
whichever comes first. The war-
ranty then expires one year from
the date upon which it takes effect.
The limitation on an action for breach
of the warranty is two years after
the expiration date or two years after
the discovery of the breach, which-
ever comes first.
An action for breach of implied
warranty, then, is barred when it is
filed almost three years after the
breach. Gensler v. Korb Roofers, 37 Md.
App. 538, 378 A.2d 180 (1977). An
amended declaration filed four years
after the alleged breach of implied
warranty is barred by a Statute of
Limitations defense as well. Bay State
Ins. Co. v. Hill, 34 Md. App. 593,
368 A.2d 1084 (1977). However, the
most recent case discussing the real
property implied warranties cir-
cumvents the limitations prescribed
in the Maryland Code by holding
that a letter from the seller agreeing
to correct defects in the new home
removed the statutory bar and ex-
tended the limitations period. Pot-
terton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md.
371, 378, 424 A.2d 761, 765 (1981).
The Potterton decision illustrates
that the Maryland courts may be in-
clined to be liberal in their appli-
cation of the implied warranties.
Liberality would be justified in light
of the limited period of time for
which the statute offers protection.
In comparison, other jurisdictions
offer longer periods for recovery. In
Alaska, the legislature has enacted
a six year limitations period, Alaska
Stat. § 09.10.55 (1962 & Supp. 1981),
and in South Dakota, the courts have
held a warranty runs for a "reason-
able" period of time as determined
by the fact finder. Sedlmajer v. Jones,
275 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979).
The Express Warranty
An express warranty for the sale
of a new home in Maryland is cre-
ated in three situations. Md. Real
Prop. Code Ann. § 10-202 (1981). If
an affirmation of fact or promise re-
lating to the new home is made a
part of the basis of the bargain be-
tween the buyer and the seller, then
the warranty is created. Id. The war-
ranty may also arise from a written
description of the home or a sample
or model of the home, as long as
the "basis of the bargain" test is met.
Id. Just as in the U.C.C. § 2-313
(1978), the warranty may be oral,
but "puffing" may be a defense. Id.
See generally Comment, Maryland's
Consumer Protection Act: A Private
Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive
Practices, 38 Md. L.Rev. 733, 734
(1979).
The procedural aspects of the ex-
press warranty are the same as those
for the implied warranties, dis-
cussed above. The Potterton court,
which circumvented procedural
limitations, did so in order to apply
both implied and express warran-
ties. Potterton, 289 Md. at 373, 424
A.2d at 763 (1981). The express war-
ranty was created by the seller's
written statement that construction
would be "in a workmanlike man-
ner substantially in accordance with
plans and specifications." Id. Thus
the contract of sale may contain a
warranty protecting the buyer after
the deed is delivered.
Breach Of Contract
An action for breach of contract
resembles a breach of express war-
ranty action because both may be
based on written or oral statements
made by the seller. The contract suit,
however, is usually barred by the
merger doctrine. This common law
doctrine vievs the deed as the en-
i
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tire agreement between the parties.
See generally 6a Powell, The Law of
Real Property 893 (1981). Inconsis-
tencies between the contract of sale
and the deed are merged into the
latter since the deed expressed the
true and final intent of the parties.
Id.
There are, however, recognized
exceptions to the merger doctrine.
One exception is the collateral
agreement. Maryland has long rec-
ognized that "parties may enter into
covenants collateral to the deed."
Bryant v. Wilson, 71 Md. 440 (1889).
These agreements survive the exe-
cution of the deed when the addi-
tional terms are consistent with the
terms of the deed. Levin v. Cook, 186
Md. 535, 539-40, 47 A.2d 505, 507
(1946).
The collateral agreement can be
made orally as in Stevens v. Mile-
stone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948).
In that case at settlement one of the
sellers told the buyers "the things
that were to be finished in the house
will be finished, also the touching
up." Id. at 66, 57 A.2d at 294. When
the finished house did not contain
insulation or basement windows as
indicated in the plans, the court held
the seller's statement at settlement
established a collateral agreement.
Id.
Maryland also recognizes an im-
plied in law contract by the builder
that he will use care and skill in the
construction of a new home. Gaybis
v. Palm, 201 Md. 78, 93 A.2d 269
(1952). The measure of damages for
breach of this contract is either the
cost of remedying the defects or the
difference in the fair market value,
depending upon the circumstances
of the case. Gilbert Const. Co. v. Gross,
212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957).
Fraud And Deceit
Another action which circum-
vents the merger doctrine is an ac-
tion for fraud or deceit. Fraud es-
sentially is an intentional,
purposefully deceptive, misrepre-
sentation of existing fact relied upon
by another party who suffers dam-
ages based upon his reliance.
Schnader v. Brooks, 160 Md. 52, 132
A.2d 381 (1926). Fraud is a difficult
action to prove because evidence of
scienter-the intent to deceive the
other party-is difficult to obtain.
However, Maryland courts have
recognized fraud in new home sales.
A statement by the builder-vendor
that the buyer and his family of
eleven could rely on the adequacy
of the septic tank system was cal-
culated to mislead the buyer when
the builder-vendor knew the sys-
tem was designed for a family of
three. Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571,
185 A.2d 344 (1962). The court held
this conduct was actionable fraud,
although the seller's silence on the
septic tank's adequacy would not
have been actionable. Id.
An easier action to prove is neg-
ligent misrepresentation. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals recently re-
affirmed its recognition of this tort,
distinguishing it from an action in
fraud. Marten's Chevrolet v. Seney, 292
Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). Neg-
ligent misrepresentation is based on
a negligent assertion by the defend-
ant of a false statement; scienter need
not be proved. Id. Thus in Marten's
Chevrolet, the plaintiff did not have
to show an intentional misrepresen-
tation, only a negligent one.
The Marten's Chevrolet case in-
volved misrepresentations made
during the sale of an automobile
dealership from Seney to Marten's
Chevrolet. If the courts apply this
tort to an arms-length transaction
between two businesses, it seems
likely they would apply it to a con-
sumer's purchase of a new home as
well. Thus, although negligent mis-
representation has not recently been
applied to the sale of a new home,
it should be considered as a viable
cause of action in that situation to-
day.
Strict Liability
Maryland follows the strict liabil-
ity theories established in Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278
Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). How-
ever, this theory has never been ap-
plied to the sale of a new home. A
nearby jurisdiction did apply the
strict liability theory to a case where
a small child suffered severe burns
and was hospitalized for 74 days due
to the lack of a mixing valve on a
hot water heater. Schipper v. Levitt
and Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965). The court in Schipper an-
alogized the purchase of a new home
(complete with a hot water heater)
to the purchase of an automobile off
the assembly line. Id. at 70, 207 A.2d
at 325. Today's buyer, the court de-
termined, acts without the assist-
ance of an architect and relies on
the superior knowledge of the seller.
Id. Thus, if personal injury results
from a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous, Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), the
seller of a new home may be held
strictly liable. Perhaps with a set of
circumstances similar to Schipper,
Maryland may choose to expand the
remedies available to the new home




The purchase of a new home is
now protected by the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act, Md. Com.
Law Code Ann. § 13-201 to -501
(1975 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act]. "Consumer
realty" was added to the Act in 1976.
1976 Md. Laws 2487. See Comment,
Maryland's Consumer Protection Act:
A Private Cause of Action for Unfair
Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 Md.
L.Rev. 733 (1979). Thus, a consumer
with new home problems may find
protection in the Act's prohibition
of unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices. Md. Com. Law Code Ann.
§ 13-303 (1981).
The statute seeks a solution
through arbitration rather than liti-
gation, but a consumer may still
pursue alternative remedies in the
courts. Devine v. Att'y Gen'l, 37 Md.
App. 439, 446-47, 377 A.2d 1194,
1198 (1977); cert. dismissed, 282 Md.
482, 385 A.2d 85 (1978). There is
little judicial gloss on the statute as
of yet, none relating to new home
sales. However, filing a complaint
with the Consumer Protection Di-
vision of the Attorney General's Of-
fice may bring about a more expe-
dient remedy than that available
from the courts.
Conclusion
A new home buyer does have
some protection against defects
which appear after the purchase of
a new house. Under the Maryland
Code, express and implied warran-
ties may attach to the sale. A Statute
of Limitations defense is available
against these warranties, but this
defense may be waived by certain
acts of the defendant. By statute,
however, at most the buyer is pro-
tected for three years.
At common law, an exception to
the merger doctrine may allow a
breach of contract action against the
seller for fraud or deceit. Another
breach of contract action may be
available against the builder if he
has failed to use care and skill in
his construction.
Since the action in fraud or deceit
is often difficult to prove, an action
for negligent misrepresentation may
be a viable alternative. The lower
courts may be willing to apply this
action in situations where evidence
of the scienter element is lacking.
Other potential remedies may be
available in strict liability or under
the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act.
The remedies listed above are
those available to the buyer in an
action against the seller or the
builder. Remedies against other po-
tential defendants should also be in-
vestigated. Large purchases some-
times bring large problems, and a








Mortgagee Title Insurance policies





TITLE BUILDING/ST PAUL AND LEXINGTON STREETS
BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21202/(301) 727-3700
Formerly The Title Guarantee Company
